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 Abstract 
 In the past decade East Asia has taken steps to increase regional integration. Th is paper examines 
the vogue for Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) currently raging in China and Japan. After mapping 
the regional links that knit East Asia together during the 1990s and 2000s, the focus then shifts to 
the speciﬁ c trade agreements that China and Japan have signed. Both countries exhibit a particular 
FTA “style;” Japan has adopted a more orthodox and comprehensive approach to its treaties, while 
China has shown greater ﬂ exibility and gradualism when dealing with FTA partners. It is still 
unclear whether these eﬀ orts will lead to a region-wide FTA, or a continued crisscrossing of bilateral 
arrangements. In either case, China’s eagerness to adapt to partner country expectations likely gives 
it an edge in becoming the regional hub of East Asia. 
 Keywords 
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 1. Introduction 
 Free trade agreements (FTAs) have rapidly proliferated in the new millennium. 
Countries on all six continents have signed FTAs, ﬁ rst with immediate neigh-
bours, and then farther abroad. Th e notion of a contiguous trade bloc – such as 
the European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), Association of Southeast Asia Nations 
(ASEAN) – has been unhinged. In direct to these larger free trade areas, bilateral 
FTAs have sprung up in many parts of the world. 
 Even in East Asia, one of the least integrated areas in the world, an FTA race is 
under way. In the new millennium, a spate of bilateral FTAs has yoked East Asia’s 
largest economies – China, Japan, Korea and Singapore – with countries on vari-
ous continents, mostly in Asia. East Asia’s ﬁ rst FTA, the 2002 Japan-Singapore 
New-Age Economic Partnership Agreement, has literally ushered in a new age. In 
search of FTA partners, these countries now scour the Asia-Paciﬁ c and beyond. 
 *) Th e author thanks Professors Karel Wellens, Andrew Lang and other participants of  Th e New 
International Law , University of Oslo and Professors Linda Yueh, Patrick Gustavsson and the other 
participants of  China, Law and Economic Growth , Stockholm School of Economics. 
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 Th is paper compares Chinese and Japanese approaches to FTA diplomacy. 
Korea and Singapore, important contributors to the East Asian FTA picture, lie 
outside the scope of this inquiry. Part 2 recounts the aﬃ  liations that knit East 
Asia together during the 1980s and 1990s, particularly the achievements of the 
Asia-Paciﬁ c Economic Cooperation (APEC) and ASEAN. Th is background 
sheds light on the events, motivations and actors animating the current FTA 
surge. Part 3 recounts the ongoing FTA surge in East Asia. Sparked by Western 
protectionism and frustration with fruitless World Trade Organization (WTO) 
negotiations, East Asian countries have also embraced the global vogue for FTAs. 
Part 4 analyses East Asian FTAs as examples of international economic law. 
Th ough still early in their FTA trajectories, Chinese and Japanese FTAs nonethe-
less show discernible dispositions. Japan prefers comprehensive, “Western-style” 
 arrangements, aiming to capture the entire agreement in a single document. 
China has taken a diﬀ erent approach, incorporating into its FTAs both Western 
and Asian legal principles. 
 2. Regional Integration: Th e Early Years 
 East Asian economic integration is not happening in a vacuum, but along paths 
well trod during the 1990s. Th e present FTA surge retraces the regional architec-
ture laid out during the 1990s. First, regional bodies such as ASEAN and APEC 
created fora in which East Asian states could discuss and help shape international 
economic policy. Building on this experience, also known as socialisation, China 
and Japan have developed methods to integrate their economies into the region. 
By looking at regional bodies, and then China’s and Japan’s speciﬁ c  regionalisation 
eﬀ orts, we gain critical insight into today’s FTA mania. 
 2.1. Institutions: ASEAN and APEC 
 2.1.1.  ASEAN 
 Like the European Union, the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations responded to a broad array of political, strategic and economic concerns. 1 
But unlike the EU or other Western arrangements, the group operates informally and 
consensually. Historically, it has not made decisions legally binding upon members, 2 
 1)  C. S. Yue, ‘Regionalism and Subregionalism in ASEAN: Th e Free Trade Area and Growth 
Triangle Models’, in Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Krueger (eds.),  Regionalism versus Multilateral Trade 
Arrangements (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1997) p.  285. 
 2)  S. Choi,  Regionalism and Open Regionalism in the APEC Region (Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Singapore, 2004) p. 14. 
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 3)   See P. J. Davidson, ‘ASEAN Features: Th e ASEAN Way and the Role of Law in ASEAN Economic 
Cooperation’, 8  Singapore Yearbook of International Law (2004) p.  165 ; F. Liu, ‘East Asian 
Regionalism: Th eoretical Perspectives’, in F. Liu and P. Régnier (eds.),  Regionalism in East Asia: 
Paradigm Shifting?  ( RoutledgeCurzon, London, 2003 ) p.  22. 
 4)  Yue,  supra note 1, p. 285. 
 5)  S. Harris, ‘Asian Multilateral Institutions and Th eir Response to the Asian Economic Crisis: Th e 
Regional and Global Implications’, in Shaun Breslin  et al. (eds.),  New Regionalisms in the Global 
Political Economy (University of Warwick, Warwick, 2000) p. 127. 
 6)   See Yue,  supra note 1, p. 287. 
 7)   See ASEAN,  Th e ASEAN Free Trade Area , available at <www.aseansec.org/12021.htm> (noting 
that the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement has eliminated intra-regional tariﬀ s on more than 99 per-
cent of goods traded between the so-called ASEAN-6 (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore and Th ailand) and on nearly 80 percent of goods traded between the four less developed 
members (Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam)). 
 8)  J. Ravenhill, ‘A Th ree Bloc World? Th e New East Asian Regionalism’, 2  International Relations of 
the Asia-Paciﬁ c (2002) p. 177. 
preferring instead to operate along the “ASEAN Way” of informality, repeated 
consultations and consensus-building. 3 
 Initially, ASEAN focused mainly on political issues: the peaceful resolution of 
territorial disputes, and the promotion of regional stability. 4 Th ese aims and the 
resultant peace have, of course, contributed signiﬁ cantly to the economic stability 
and success of Southeast Asia. 5 But only in the wake of economic integration 
elsewhere in the world did free trade surface onto the ASEAN agenda. 6 
 While ASEAN has enjoyed modest success in economic integration, 7 its 
 primary contribution to regional integration lies outside the economic realm, 
and outside of Southeast Asia for that matter. ASEAN is  the centre of gravity 
for this part of the world, rarer still in being comprised solely of Asian states. 
It continues to inspire trust in the region; often the latest Asian initiative 
began as a highly successful ASEAN one. Th e ASEAN Regional Forum and 
the “ASEAN Plus Th ree” (APT) framework exemplify this trend. Both fora 
have linked China, Japan and Korea with Southeast Asia, and to a lesser extent 
with each other. 
 2.1.2. APEC 
 Like ASEAN, the Asian Paciﬁ c Economic Cooperation oﬀ ers proof that regional-
ism in some parts of the world triggers regionalism elsewhere. 8 Th e late 1980s 
witnessed two regional shifts that alarmed unaﬃ  liated Paciﬁ c states, notably 
Australia and Japan. First, the European Union advanced from a tightly knit 
customs union to an even more protectionist Single Market in the late 1980s. 
Second, the 1989 creation of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (later 
NAFTA) further raised the protectionist barriers to unaﬃ  liated states. Seeking to 
buﬀ et global waves by addressing regional issues, APEC has served as a sounding 
board, but not much else. 
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 9)  A. Yanai, ‘Characteristics of APEC Trade Liberalization: A Comparative Analysis with the WTO’, 
in J. Okamoto (ed.),  Trade Liberalization and APEC  ( RoutledgeCurzon , London,  2004) p.  13 . 
 10)  APEC initially comprised the six ASEAN states (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore and Th ailand), Canada and the US (then parties to the Canada-United States Free Trade 
Agreement (CUSFTA)), Australia and New Zealand (then parties to the Australia-New Zealand 
Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZERTA)) and Korea and Japan. 
 11)  J. Shen, ‘China & APEC: Regionalization from China’s Domestic Perspective’, in B. Hettne 
(ed.),  Th e New Regionalism and the Future of Security and Development (Palgrave Macmillan, 
Hampshire, UK, 2000) p. 257. 
 12)   See S. J. Maswood, ‘Japan’s Foreign Policy and Regionalism’, in S. J. Maswood (ed.),  Japan and 
East Asian Regionalism (Routledge, London, 2001) p. 9. 
 13)  C. M. Dent, ‘Regionalism & Inter-regional Co-operation’, in C. M. Dent (ed.),  Th e European 
Union and East Asia: An Economic Relationship (Routledge, London, 1999) p . 222 . 
 14)   See Maswood,  supra note 12, p. 19. 
 From its inception, APEC aimed to liberalise trade in a soft, aspirational 
 manner. It began “with no organizational framework”, 9 nor an exclusivity require-
ment. Part of its haphazard nature lies in the fact that many original members 
were already party to other FTAs. 10 And perhaps indicative of its partially Asian 
constituency, it did not employ legally binding strictures to do so. 
 Given their diﬀ erent levels of development, geopolitical ambitions and interest 
in regionalisation, China and Japan have had diverse roles in APEC. China, 
though not a founding member, has been a comparatively active one. Initially, 
APEC provided China a voice in regional aﬀ airs it could not have at the global 
level. 11 Th e organisation’s non-binding, non-intrusive nature did not threaten 
China’s zealously guarded sovereignty, and appealed to its hesitant approach to 
international organisations. At the same time, its economic agenda acculturated 
China to the new global dictates of lower tariﬀ s, free movements of capital and 
deregulation. 
 Japan, in keeping with its relatively low proﬁ le in regional aﬀ airs, has been a 
lacklustre participant in APEC. 12 Th ough instrumental in establishing APEC, 
and setting its initial agendas, 13 Japan has since receded from prominence. One 
critic suggested that Japan had been marginalised into the role of mediator 
between the unilateral US, with its insistence on free trade, and the wider Asian-
Paciﬁ c community, which seeks broader cooperation in economic aﬀ airs. 14 Th ere 
may be some truth to the interpretation, but that does not burnish the rather dim 
view of Japan’s regional leadership. 
 2.2. National Eﬀ orts 
 2.2.1. China: Dense Institutionalism 
 Since the end of the Cold War, China has spun a dense organisational web around 
itself in Southeast Asia, Central Asia and to a lesser extent East Asia. China’s rela-
tionship with ASEAN, for instance, has expanded in several directions. In 1991, 
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 15)   See ASEAN Regional Forum, Ministry of Foreign Aﬀ airs of the People’s Republic of China, 
5 August 2002, <www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2612/t15313.htm>. 
 16)   See H. De Santis, ‘Th e Dragon and the Tigers: China and Asian Regionalism’, 23  World Policy 
Journal  ( Summer  2005) pp.  27 –2 8. 
 17)  Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 4 November 2002, Article 4. 
 18)  De Santis,  supra note 16, p. 24 (noting Chinese contestation of the Spratly Islands, with 
Vietnam, and Mischief Reef, with the Philippines). 
 19)  Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations and the People’s Republic of China on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, 
8 October 2003. 
 20)  China also plays important roles in the Kunming Initiative, which fosters economic ties between 
China and South Asia, and the Greater Mekong Sub-region, which improves infrastructure in 
China and Southeast Asia. 
 21)  Declaration on Establishment of Shanghai Co-operation Organization, 15 June 2001, Article 6. 
 22)  ‘Five-Nation Joint Statement Stresses Further Cooperation in Regional Security’,  People’s Daily 
Online , 26 August 1999. 
China aﬃ  liated with ASEAN by becoming a consultative partner at the ASEAN 
Post-Ministerial Conference. In 1994, China announced its intention to take up 
security issues by joining the annual ASEAN Regional Forum. 15 China further 
deepened the relationship in 1997, pioneering the ASEAN Plus One framework, 
which Japan and Korea quickly emulated, creating ASEAN Plus Th ree. Th ough 
only an informal addition to annual ASEAN meetings, the APT may be the only 
forum in which oﬃ  cials from East and Southeast Asia, but nowhere else, convene 
to discuss international aﬀ airs. 16 
 China’s relationship with ASEAN has created trust throughout the region. 
In November 2002, China acceded to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
in Southeast Asia (TAC-SEA), and thereby agreed to “resolve territorial and juris-
dictional disputes by peaceful means”. 17 Th is allayed China’s coastal neighbours, 
especially the Philippines and Vietnam, which have outstanding disputes with 
China over island chains in the South China Sea. 18 In addition, China and ASEAN 
further committed themselves to cooperate in the realms of economics, politics 
and security in the October 2003 Joint Declaration on Peace and Prosperity. 19 
 China has also established its own regional initiatives, 20 most notably the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Th is grew out of the “Shanghai Five”, 
an agreement signed by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan for 
the purposes of “conﬁ dence-building in the military sphere” and “mutual reduc-
tion of military forces in border areas”. 21 Over time, the countries have  committed 
themselves to non-military threats, such as arms smuggling, drug-traﬃ  cking and 
religious extremism, 22 and lately toward economic cooperation, energy and trade. 
China has thus carefully sculpted a credible, and peaceable, regional proﬁ le. 
 2.2.2. Japan: Regional Production Networks 
 On the whole, Japan has been a tepid regionalist. Recent events suggest a more 
dynamic regional policy, but for most of the post-War period, Japanese  integration 
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 23)  G. D. Hook, ‘Japan’s Role in the East Asian Political Economy: An Emerging Region?’, in G. D. Hook 
and H. Harukiyo (eds.),  Th e Political Economy of Japanese Globalization (Routledge, London, 2001) p. 49. 
 24)  T. Shiraishi, ‘Japan & Southeast Asia’, in P. J. Katzenstein and T. J. Pempel (eds.),  Network 
Power: Japan and East Asia (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1997) p . 187 . 
 25)  R. F. Doner, ‘Japan in East Asia: Institutions and Regional Leadership’, in Katzenstein and 
Pempel,  ibid. , p . 203 . 
 26)   Ibid ., p. 212. 
 27)   Ibid. , p. 214. 
 28)  T. Morris-Suzuki, ‘Japanese Technology and the New International Division of Knowledge in 
Asia’, in S. Tokunaga (ed.),  Japan’s Foreign Investment & Asian Economic Interdependence: Production, 
Trade & Financial Systems  ( University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo,  1992) p . 143 . 
 29)   See W. Hatch, ‘Regionalization Trumps Globalization: Japanese Production Networks in Asia’, 
in R. Stubbs and G. R. Underhill (eds.),  Political Economy & Th e Changing Global Order (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2000) p. 387. 
 30)   Ibid ., p. 390. 
 31)   See Morris-Suzuki,  supra note 28, p. 145. 
eﬀ orts were limited to the economy. Of course, the Japanese private sector and 
government have poured money into Southeast Asia, China, Korea and Taiwan. 23 
Th e twin arms of governmental oﬃ  cial development assistance (ODA) and cor-
porate foreign direct investment (FDI) created transnational production lines 
that now snake across East and Southeast Asia. 24 
 Japanese engagement with Asia stretches back to its colonial period, the Paciﬁ c 
War and the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. After the War, Japan 
invested in the natural resources and manufacturing sectors of several Asian 
neighbours, 25 a tendency that continues until the present. With the re-evaluation of 
the yen in 1985, investment in Asia soared; the amount of investment between 1986 
and 1989 surpassed the entire amount of investment between 1951 and 1985. 26 
 When the cost of manufacturing goods in the Japanese archipelago grew too 
expensive, automobile and electronics manufacturers oﬀ shored their production 
facilities to Southeast Asia. In any given Honda, for instance, one might ﬁ nd an 
Indonesian engine, Malaysian fenders, Th ai clutches and a Filipino  transmission. 27 
A similar transnational eﬀ ort converges to produce a Panasonic television. 28 
 Th ese networks created a buﬀ er zone for Japanese corporations as they faced 
increasingly severe competition from globalisation and Euro-American protec-
tionism. By the end of the millennium, in the eyes of one observer, “Japanese 
political and business elites viewed the entire [Asian] region … as one organic 
unit, or what the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) began to 
call ‘a soft cooperation network’”. 29 Th is soft network had the added beneﬁ t of 
keeping a large number of white collar jobs for Japanese executives, who relocated 
to Southeast Asia in order to oversee the production facilities. 30 It also permitted 
the transfer of certain technologies from Japan to Southeast Asia, though this has 
not signiﬁ cantly spurred the capacity for technological innovation in the latter. 31 
 Despite these achievements, Japan has shown little interest in regionalisation 
outside of the economic realm. Th is may reﬂ ect in part Japan’s unique  relationship 
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 32)   See ‘China to advance bilateral, regional free trade negotiation’,  China View , 15 September 
2006, at <news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-09/15/content_5097127.htm>. 
 33)   Ibid. 
 34)   See ‘China, ROK agree to start negotiations on free trade area’,  People’s Daily Online , 14 October 
2006, <english.people.com.cn/200610/14/eng20061014_311722.html>. 
with the United States, which has forced Japan to take a more limited stance in 
international aﬀ airs generally and security arrangements in particular. Nonetheless, 
Japan has been free to pursue other forms of integration, whether in the spheres 
of politics, monetary integration or culture. 
 Japan’s recently assertive FTA strategy in one way deviates from this low  proﬁ le. 
But it is vitally predicated upon these economic foundations; Japanese  investment 
and aid in Southeast Asia have given it a leg up in negotiating agreements with 
Singapore, Th ailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. 
 3. FTA Surge 
 Th e new FTA boom has roots stretching back to the late 1980s. With the passage 
of the Single Market in Europe, and NAFTA in North America, protectionism 
ﬂ ourished. Asia’s two largest export markets, Europe and North America, were 
now considerably more diﬃ  cult to penetrate. Southeast Asia responded in kind, 
forming its own regional trade agreement in 1992. China, Japan and Korea, on 
the other hand, initially lacked the diplomatic networks, mutual trust and institu-
tional background that would permit such arrangements. After a decade or so of 
network building, these countries have entered an FTA boom. Since 2002, China 
and Japan have each signed three FTAs with countries in Asia and the Americas. 
Here we examine these arrangements, and then turn to future prospects. 
 3.1. China: Diversity and Conformity 
 China has signed Closer Economic Partnership Arrangements (CEPAs) with 
Hong and Macao, and FTAs with ASEAN, Chile and Pakistan. 32 It is in late 
stages of negotiation with both Australia and New Zealand, and has begun talks 
with the Gulf Cooperation Council, Singapore and the Southern Africa Customs 
Union. It has even conducted a feasibility study with distant Iceland, 33 and 
announced its intention to begin negotiations with Korea. 34 Chinese interest in 
free trade thus extends far beyond its immediate neighbours in the Asia-Paciﬁ c, 
though that continues to be the important locus in its FTA policy. 
 Th is section examines the four agreements (three foreign, one internal) China 
has signed. In addition to trade in goods and services, Chinese FTAs promote deeper 
economic integration through investment measures, protection of intellectual 
308 T. Webster / Nordic Journal of International Law 77 (2008) 301–318
 35)  R. S. Rajan, ‘Trade Liberalization and the New Regionalism in the Asia-Paciﬁ c: Taking Stock of 
Recent Events’, 5  International Relations of the Asia Paciﬁ c (2005) p. 221. 
 36)  China signed CEPAs with Hong Kong on 29 June 2003, and with Macao on 17 October 2003. 
Since the agreements are essentially the same, the focus here is on the Hong Kong CEPA. 
 37)  Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (hereinafter CEPA), 
29 June 2003, Preamble. 
 38)   Ibid. , Article 5. 
 39)   See generally CEPA Annex 4, Speciﬁ c Commitments on Liberalization of Trade in Services. 
 40)  CEPA, Article 13. 
property rights, mutual recognition of standards, harmonisation of custom 
 procedures, and so on. 35 At the same time, it should be noted that China has 
not taken a cookie-cutter, one-size-ﬁ ts-all approach to FTAs. Rather, with each 
new arrangement, China has proven itself to be ﬂ exible, dynamic and even con-
ciliatory. Th is makes it a desirable and dependable trading partner for countries 
throughout the region, and perhaps the world. 
 3.1.1. Prelude: Hong Kong and Macao 
 In line with its gradualist approach to opening up to the outside world, China 
began its free trade journey with the quasi-autonomous territories of Hong Kong 
and Macao. Th e CEPAS, which brought the former colonies closer into the 
Chinese fold, marked tentative steps toward freer bilateral trade. 36 Th e agreement 
aims to “promote the joint economic prosperity and development” of China and 
Hong Kong, while facilitating “further development of economic links between 
the two sides and other countries and regions”. 37 Th us, China viewed this initial 
arrangement not only as a way of reinforcing economic links with Hong Kong 
and Macao, but also as a harbinger of China’s next rounds of FTAs. 
 China’s ﬁ rst trade liberalisation scheme covered a fairly typical range of topics: 
trade in goods, trade in services and investment facilitation. For goods, Hong 
Kong merely maintained its zero-tariﬀ  rate on goods from China. China, for its 
part, phased out tariﬀ s on goods originating in Hong Kong between 2004 and 
1 January 2006. 38 
 Trade in services covers various sectors, from the conventional (advertising, 
accounting, telecommunications, insurance) to the rarer (tourism, legal services, 
recognition of professional qualiﬁ cations). 39 Given Hong Kong’s status as a major 
ﬁ nancial hub, cooperation in banking and securities was of particular impor-
tance. Th e agreement a) permits state-owned banks to locate their international 
treasury and foreign exchange centres to Hong Kong; b) allows for mainland 
insurance companies, and other private enterprises, to list on the Hong Kong 
stock exchange; and c) calls for greater cooperation and information sharing 
between ﬁ nancial regulators. 40 Quite understandably, China wants to draw on 
Hong Kong’s expertise to build a sophisticated ﬁ nancial sector. Moreover, China 
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 41)  A. Antkiewicz and J. Whalley, ‘China’s New Regional Trade Agreements’, 11  National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Working Paper 10992 (2004). 
 42)  CEPA, Article 14. 
 43)   Ibid. , Article 7. 
 44)  J. Wanandi, ‘China and Asia Paciﬁ c Regionalism’, in K. Ryosei and J. Wang (eds.),  Th e Rise of 
China and a Changing East Asian Order (Japan Center for International Exchange, Tokyo, 2004) 
pp. 44, 45. 
 45)  Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation Between the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter Framework Agreement), 
5 November 2002, Article 1. 
 46)   See Liu,  supra note 3, pp. 20–22. 
expects that Hong Kong service-providers and professionals will train Chinese 
workers in these new ﬁ elds. 41 
 Of course, certain provisions reﬂ ect the unique status of China  vis-à-vis Hong 
Kong, and have not been duplicated in other agreements. One such innovation 
allows Chinese residents of Guangdong Province (on Hong Kong’s northern 
 border) to visit Hong Kong on special tourist visas. 42 More apropos trade, Hong 
Kong and China have agreed to do away with anti-dumping measures. 43 From its 
very ﬁ rst free trade agreement, China has exhibited a degree of innovativeness, 
but also a willingness to take advantage of the unique features of the bilateral 
relationship. Th is adaptability manifests itself repeatedly. 
 3.1.2. China-Asian Free Trade Agreement 
 As described above, China actively cultivated better relations with its Southeast 
Asian neighbours throughout the 1990s. By attending various ASEAN meetings, 
cooperating on security issues and developing a code of conduct for disputes in 
the South China Sea, China demonstrated its trustworthiness to the various 
members of ASEAN. 44 
 Th is strategy has also had a signiﬁ cant economic component. Premier Zhu 
Rongji proposed the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in 2001. 
In November 2002, China and ASEAN signed a loosely worded Framework 
Agreement with the multiple aims of: strengthening economic, trade and invest-
ment cooperation; liberalising and promoting trade in goods and services; explor-
ing new areas for closer economic cooperation; and facilitating the economic 
integration of the least developed ASEAN members. 45 As with the Hong Kong 
CEPA, this agreement introduces several FTA innovations. 
 Th e Framework Agreement itself oﬀ ers only the barest of skeletons, leaving the 
task of elaboration to subsequent agreements and annexes; CAFTA does not so 
much declare as  unfold a constant work in progress. Th is in itself comes as 
an innovation, reﬂ ecting concepts that scholars identify with Asian diplomacy 
generally: informality, incrementalism and minimalism. 46 Rather than grandiose 
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 47)  Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Co-operation Between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of 
China, 29 November 2004. 
 48)   Ibid. , Preamble. 
 49)   See PRC Ministry of Foreign Commerce,  Minister Bo Xilai Answering Questions of the Press on 
China-ASEAN FTA , <boxilai2.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/speech/200608/20060802846310.html>. 
 50)  By agreeing to free up substantially all trade, China and ASEAN acknowledge the standards 
articulated, though rarely enforced, by the WTO. 
 51)   See ‘China-ASEAN Agriculture Trade on Fast Track’,  China Daily , 9 August 2004, <china.org
.cn/english/BAT/103399.htm>. 
 52)   Ibid. 
 53)  A. Greenwald, ‘Note: Th e ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA): A Legal Response to 
China’s Economic Rise?’, 16  Duke Journal Comparative and International Law (2006) p.  198. 
 54)   Minister Bo Xilai Answering Questions ,  supra note 49. 
 55)  Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation 
Between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China, 6 October 
2003. 
 56)  Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Economic Co-operation Between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s 
Republic of China, 29 November 2004. 
 57)  Plan of Action to Implement the Beijing Declaration on ASEAN-China ICT Cooperative 
Partnership for Common Development, 14 January 2007. 
plans or dramatic breakthroughs, CAFTA has come into existence gradually, 
annex-by-annex, as a chain of modest steps. ASEAN diplomacy typically operates 
in the following way: issues are discussed; a level of agreement on certain (but not 
all) issues is attained; a memorial sets forth the mutual understanding; parties 
reconvene a year later to continue discussions. 
 Th is gradualism seems to be working. Th e Agreement on Trade in Goods, the 
ﬁ rst annex to the Framework Agreement, entered into force in 2005. 47 It calls 
for the gradual reduction of tariﬀ s by 2010 for the more developed members 
of ASEAN, and 2015 for the less developed members. 48 By that time, over 
90  percent of trade between ASEAN and China will be tariﬀ -free, 49 liberalising 
 “substantially all trade” within a decade. 50 
 Th e ﬁ rst installation of the Agreement on Trade in Goods focused on agricul-
ture. With the Early Harvest Program, 51 China and several members of ASEAN 
agreed to slash tariﬀ s on 600 agricultural products beginning in 2004, eliminat-
ing them altogether by 2006. 52 Signiﬁ cantly, China takes the lead by  lowering its 
tariﬀ s before many of its ASEAN partners follow suit. 53 By all accounts, this has 
been a success for China and ASEAN; in just one year, Chinese agricultural 
imports from ASEAN grew 46.6 percent, and exports grew 31.2 percent. 54 Th is 
has generated optimism on both sides for continued tariﬀ  reductions in other 
goods. 
 Since 2002, CAFTA has been ﬂ eshed out with additional agreements: the 
Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement (2003); 55 a Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism (2004); 56 a Plan of Action for Information Technology (2007); 57 and 
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Government of the Republic of Chile (hereinafter CCFTA), 18 November 2005. 
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.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/01/content_5161337.htm>. 
 62)   Ibid. 
 63)  CCFTA, Article 2. 
 64)  Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (hereinafter CPFTA), 24 November 2006. 
most recently a Service Trade Agreement. 58 Some of these, such as the Amendment 
Protocol, contain an elaborate list of procedures, contrasting quite markedly with 
the heavily schematic Framework Agreement. It is tempting to call such additions 
“Western” in their desire to capture every imaginable contingency. Nevertheless, 
the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement retains a gradualism and informality 
unique among FTAs. 
 3.1.3. Outward Bound: Chine-Chile Free Trade Agreement 
 On 1 October 2006, the ﬁ rst part of the China-Chile FTA went into eﬀ ect. 59 
China adapted to Chile’s largely Western standards, entering into an agreement of 
121 articles, and 62 pages in English, making it much longer than the CAFTA 
(23 pages, 16 articles) and CEPA agreements (11 pages, 23 articles). Without a 
long history of trade relations, China and Chile elected a comprehensive package 
 ab initio , minimising ambiguity and clearly illuminating all details. China can thus 
modulate between the keys of Western formalism and Asian incrementalism. 
 Between 2007 and 2017, China and Chile will progressively eliminate tariﬀ s 
on 97 percent of tariﬀ  lines. 60 In the ﬁ rst cut, already in eﬀ ect, China eliminated 
tariﬀ s on 28 percent of its tariﬀ  lines, while Chile eliminated them on 43 percent 
of its tariﬀ  lines. 61 Th e ﬁ rst round of tariﬀ  reduction focuses on agricultural 
 products, chemicals, textiles and electronics. 62 Most importantly for resource- 
challenged China, copper is also included. 
 In keeping with the larger trend, the China-Chile FTA extends beyond goods 
and services. It addresses fair competition, diversiﬁ cation of trade and dispute 
resolution. 63 In other words,  procedure is a critical component to this agreement, 
and proceeds in elaborate detail. 
 3.1.4. Investing in the West: Chinese-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement 
 Unlike CAFTA, the China-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement (CPFTA) 64 did not 
spring from a long courtship between the two countries; it took just 18 months 
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and six rounds of talks. 65 While Sino-Pakistani diplomatic relations have been 
warm for most of their contemporary history  66 (both states were founded in 
the late 1940s), the FTA still seemed a surprise. China’s regionalisation eﬀ orts 
had focused primarily on Southeast Asia, and to a lesser extent on Central Asia. 
Th e CPFTA attests to both China’s newfound desire to be a regional leader, and 
Pakistan’s keen appetite for foreign investment and technology. 
 Th e CPFTA is not expansive, covering trade in goods and services and invest-
ment. It takes an extremely ﬂ exible approach toward tariﬀ  reduction, dividing 
tariﬀ s into ﬁ ve categories, each with a diﬀ erent percentage reduction and imple-
mentation deadline. 67 Periodic tariﬀ  reviews, including one “at the end of the fourth 
year or at the beginning of the ﬁ fth year”, ensure that implementing future tariﬀ  
schemes will not damage either side. Th e agreement states that both sides “shall 
endeavor” to eliminate 90 percent of the tariﬀ  lines, but only spells out the reduc-
tion of 85 percent of the tariﬀ  lines. 68 Flexibility seems the operative word here. 69 
 In addition, CPFTA slakes some of Pakistan’s thirst for foreign investment. 70 
It provides protection to Chinese investors in Pakistan, which has already led 
Chinese companies to invest in Pakistan’s industry and infrastructure. 71 Th e ﬁ rst 
signs are already visible. 72 In this light, free trade seems a distant afterthought to 
the imminent realisation of ﬁ nancial cooperation. China is steadily cementing its 
position as a regional power. 
 3.2. Japan: Scratching Beneath the Surface 
 In contrast to China’s newfound enthusiasm for FTAs, Japan has a longer and 
more contested history with them. During the Uruguay Rounds of the WTO, 
Japanese delegates aimed to minimise the “adverse eﬀ ects” of FTAs; they wanted 
the General Agreement on Tariﬀ s and Trade (GATT) to provide discipline to the 
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formation and regulation of FTAs. 73 Until quite recently, Japan had staunchly 
advocated multilateral trade. 
 In the new millennium, however, Japan’s fear of being excluded from the “glo-
bal FTA game” has led to a realignment of its international economic policies. 74 
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Aﬀ airs (MOFA) captures this change with paradoxi-
cal brevity: “FTAs increase Japan’s bargaining power in WTO negotiations.” 75 
Needless to say, credibility in multilateral institutions is not the primary aim of 
Japan’s Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) policy. Th e MOFA has also 
noted Japan’s desire to facilitate community-building, stability and prosperity in 
East Asia. 76 For the ﬁ rst time since the Paciﬁ c War, Japan is seriously attempting 
to transform its economic capital into political and diplomatic capital; FTAs are 
the enzymes in this process of conversion. 
 With three agreements in eﬀ ect, and several others in various stages of negotia-
tion, Japan has entered the FTA age at full force. Technically speaking, Japan has 
entered the EPA age, which seeks deeper forms of integration in selected areas. 77 
Th is section ﬁ rst examines the EPAs with Singapore, Mexico and Malaysia, and 
then takes up Japan’s ongoing negotiations. 
 3.2.1. Japan-Singapore New Age Economic Partnership 78 
 In what has become a standard trend among East Asian countries, Japan chose 
a comparatively minor trading partner to initiate its EPA strategy. Singapore 
made a sensible choice for several reasons, not the least of which was its virtu-
ally non-existent agricultural sector. 79 Singapore’s advanced markets, 80 FTA 
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experience 81 and strong intellectual property regime persuaded Japanese  oﬃ  cials 
that the agreement would make a good “learning experience”. 
 JSEPA encapsulates several features of Japan’s grander economic policy. It aims 
to heighten Japan’s regional presence by exporting ﬁ nancial and technological 
expertise to key Southeast Asian players. Th ough a bilateral agreement, JSEPA 
envisions Japanese involvement with the rest of Southeast Asia, 82 particularly 
countries with nascent capital markets. 83 It also incorporates a wide range of coop-
erative measures in investment, information technology, tourism, science and 
technology, human resources development and education. Th is is a wide-ranging 
plan for such a small partner-country, but reﬂ ects Japan’s grand  ambitions to 
integrate across geographic and strategic borders. 
 3.2.2. Japan-Mexico Economic Partnership Agreement 
 In 2004, Japan signed its ﬁ rst, and perhaps only, EPA with a non-Asian state. 
Availing itself of Mexico’s own intricate FTA network of 43 countries, Japan 
gained tariﬀ -free access to key European, North American and South American 
markets. 84 Th is is as far as Japan needs to go in the Americas. Mexico beneﬁ ts 
from lower tariﬀ s on Japan’s USD 60 billion food industry. 85 It also hopes to get 
an investment boost, though this seems unlikely in light of Japan’s heavy invest-
ment in Southeast Asia. Japan would prefer to consummate EPAs with its existing 
production lines in Southeast Asia rather than create new ones in North America. 
Nevertheless, after a year in eﬀ ect, both Japan and Mexico have both seen signiﬁ -
cant increases in bilateral trade, with Japan doing slightly better. 86 
 3.2.3. Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership Agreement 
 After two years of negotiation, the Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership 
Agreement entered into force in July 2006. Japan’s decades of economic engage-
ment with Malaysia are well represented. Th e EPA progressively eliminates tariﬀ s 
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on automobiles and auto parts, bearing the unmistakable stamp of the car 
 industry. For its part, Malaysia will receive a much needed technological and 
ﬁ nancial boost to modernise its aging factories. Th e agreement eliminates tariﬀ s 
on 97  percent of the value of bilateral trade, 87 including agricultural products, 
ﬁ sheries, footwear, rubber and textiles. Th is is good training for the Japanese 
agricultural sector, which will face even severer competition if and when other 
agreements with other countries materialise. 
 Like the others, the Japan-Malaysia agreement aims for cooperation across 
various sectors. Japan is concerned about the protection of investment and intel-
lectual property rights, while Malaysia looks forward to deepening the “socio-
economic partnership”. 88 An example of the latter was announced last October, 
when Japan agreed to open a “Skills Training Centre” in Shah Alam, 15 miles 
west of Kuala Lumpur. Th e centre will train “master trainers” in the latest auto-
motive technologies developed in Japan; they will in turn go back to their com-
panies and instruct colleagues. 89 Th e footprint of the Japanese automobile industry 
is once again apparent, giving Malaysia a slight edge  vis-à-vis its regional 
 competitors: Indonesia, the Philippines and Th ailand. 
 3.2.4. Japan’s EPA Future 
 Japanese EPA diplomacy shows no sign of slowing. Th e present focus is to conclude 
the ongoing negotiations with Th ailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. Japan 
has had several rounds of discussions with each country, but cannot convince 
Southeast Asian auto manufacturers to phase out tariﬀ s on Japanese cars and auto 
components. 90 Nevertheless, one of these agreements is likely to be Japan’s next. 91 
 4. East Asian FTAs 
 For the past ﬁ ve years, China and Japan have sown the seeds of regional integration 
through far-reaching FTA diplomacy. Attention to these new forms of international 
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economic law sheds light on the current boom, and helps illuminate the possibility 
of future regional integration. A brief overview of the relevant WTO provisions on 
free trade agreements will help situate the discussion. 
 4.1. Th e WTO and FTAs 
 As WTO members, China and Japan must abide by certain obligations before 
establishing free trade agreements. In addition to notifying the WTO, 92 they 
must satisfy three requirements. 93 First, the elimination of duties and other restric-
tions must apply to “substantially all the trade” between countries. 94 Second, 
restrictions on trade with countries  outside of the FTA cannot be higher than they 
were “prior to the formation of the free-trade area”. 95 Th ird, the formation of the 
FTA must take place “within a reasonable period of time”. 96 As a developing 
country, China may avail itself of the less onerous standards articulated in the 
Enabling Clause. 97 
 By and large, Chinese and Japanese FTAs liberate substantially all trade, though 
Japan adheres to this standard somewhat more strictly. Japanese FTAs consist-
ently exceed the  de facto standard of 90 percent of trade in goods, with no eco-
nomic sectors entirely excepted. 98 Japan’s EPAs eliminated tariﬀ s on 98 percent of 
trade with Singapore, 99 94 percent with Mexico and 95 percent with Malaysia. 100 
Japan has also agreed to do so within the generally accepted “reasonable period” 
of ten years. 101 
 China has also taken the requirement seriously. Th e agreements with ASEAN 
and Chile both eliminate tariﬀ s on 90 percent of trade in goods within a decade. 
Th e agreement with Pakistan, by contrast, does not extend quite so far, in eﬀ ect 
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aspiring to reach 90 percent, but concretely providing for only 85 percent. 
Nevertheless, given that Pakistan and China can avail themselves of the lower 
standards dictated by the Enabling Clause, this still represents an impressive 
eﬀ ort. Again, only time will tell how closely China and Pakistan actually get to 
“substantially all the trade”. 
 4.2. Chinese and Japanese FTAs 
 China and Japan have evinced diﬀ erent and, to a certain extent, competitive 
strategies in adapting international economic law to political and diplomatic pre-
rogatives. Scholars have noted the tension generated in Tokyo when Beijing signs 
an FTA, and vice versa. 102 With each new agreement, China and Japan augment 
their regional stature. 
 China has taken pains to accommodate the expectations of partner countries. 
Chile, as its previous FTAs show, 103 prefers orthodox, comprehensive FTAs, 
 focusing almost exclusively on goods. Accordingly, the China-Chile FTA covers 
primarily trade in goods, and has few of the innovations apparent in other 
FTAs. On the other hand, ﬂ exibility is the operative word in the China-Pakistan 
FTA, which defers key FTA elements – such as which products to lower tariﬀ s 
on – to later negotiations. Th is kind of uncertainty would be anathema to the 
 comprehensive approach generally favoured in Western FTAs. 
 Th e China-ASEAN FTA proves to be the most interesting as a specimen of 
international economic law. Th e “ASEAN Way” of incremental consensus-building 
emerges as the key characteristic in the ongoing expansion of this agreement. 
After learning how to cooperate with ASEAN through a decade of political and 
security initiatives, China has agreed to operate by its cardinal diplomatic principle. 
With each new annex that China and ASEAN add, the relationship deepens, 
dispelling Southeast Asian anxieties about the “China threat”. 
 Japan has shown a more orthodox approach to free trade agreements, though 
not woodenly so. Decades of investment and involvement in Southeast Asia have 
paved the way for Japan’s ﬁ rst wave of EPAs in that region. Th is will not only help 
Japan’s key industries (automobile and electronics) acclimate to increased global 
competition (including China), it could also lead to new forms of regional 
 cooperation, as the training school planned for Shah Alam demonstrates. 
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 Indeed, Japan’s new international economic law is most interesting when it 
deviates most widely from the meat and potatoes of goods and services. For 
instance, what kind of scientiﬁ c and educational opportunities will the EPA with 
Malaysia lead to? How can Japanese expertise in the ﬁ nancial services and capital 
markets sectors be exported to Th ailand? What kind of measures will Japan adopt 
to allow Filipina nurses and caregivers into Japan? In honing its FTA practices, 
Japan is closely re-evaluating opportunities and the strengths of its relationships 
with various “benefactor states” in Southeast Asia. 
 5. Conclusion 
 Since 2002, a new wave of regional integration has swept East Asia. In their own 
ways, China and Japan have promoted economic regionalisation through a wide 
array of FTAs/EPAs that crisscross the Asia-Paciﬁ c. Th is movement has multiple 
motivations, including the protectionism of regional eﬀ orts elsewhere, height-
ened competitiveness in numerous sectors and the realisation that interdepend-
ency is, quite literally, the way of the world. In addition, the FTA explosion is 
closely tied to the emerging contest for regional leadership by China and Japan. 
Both countries have assumed an FTA/EPA strategy that links previous diplomatic 
eﬀ orts with current economic mandates. While both countries are eager to be the 
regional hub, it is not clear whether this desire will spark a region-wide free trade 
agreement, or a continued streak of bilateralism. In all likelihood, only when a 
signiﬁ cant number of China’s and Japan’s FTA partners  overlap will a regional free 
trade agreement be imaginable. Alternatively, a neutral third party such as Korea 
may step in to bridge the diﬀ erences. 
